This paper quantifies the magnitude of transitions across occupational categories in Colombia, a country with high unemployment and informality but quickly increasing its social security coverage in healthcare. The analysis makes use of a panel of households between 2008 and 2009 and representative of the main metropolitan areas in the country. Results confirm that transitions are large and asymmetric (twice as likely to happen from formal to informal occupations as vice versa). These results, however, conceal an additional asymmetry typically overlooked: salaried formal workers are more likely to transition first into salaried informal occupations than self-employment and unemployment; instead, informal self-employed are more likely to transition into unemployment or out of the labor force than formal occupations. Furthermore, better education (better chances) and lower earnings (more need) increase the probability of labor transitions. Those already affiliated to health insurance are less likely to transition but affiliation to old-age pension insurance does not affect transitioning decisions. Females transition more than males. In the presence of these high-volume asymmetric transitions (and other factors such as workers' preferences and risk perceptions) the expansion of non-contributive social security schemes may seriously de-incentivize formality.
INTRODUCTION
Despite the growing evidence of the impacts of the global financial crisis on labor, 1 analyses on the volume and determinants of labor transitions are few and not recent. This paper addresses this knowledge gap focusing on Colombia, a country with one of the largest rates of unemployment and informality in Latin America, even before the global financial meltdown. According to the Colombian National Department of Statistics Administration (Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística-DANE), there are more informal workers than formal salaried workers (excluding public workers), formal workers defined by DANE -as in this paper-as workers with both pension and health insurance coverage. Also, the country ranks first in the region in terms of minimum wages and non-wage costs.
Interestingly, the reform of the Colombian Social Protection System, SPS, 2 in 2002 has been associated with impressive increases in individual health care coverage (even among self-employed workers) but scant increases in pension coverage. ILO (2008) shows that health care coverage increased from 47 percent (20 percent) of the working population (self-employed) to 86 percent (81 percent) between 2000 and 2007, whereas for the same period there was only an increase from 34 percent to 36 percent in pension coverage. In other words, 13 million more people are now covered by health care (those covered increased from 21 to 34 million people) and around 4 million more individuals are covered by the pension system (DNP, 2008) .
Labor market and social protection policies have been increasingly intertwined (Levy 2007 , Perry et al. 2007 , Cunningham 2007 and Bernal et al. 2009 , with important fiscal, productivity and growth repercussions.
3 As a result, informality is believed by many researchers to be a preferred voluntary option for workers (as convincingly argued by Maloney 2004 and Perry et al. 2007 in the Latin American context), after comparing a social protection non-contributive system providing free health services and a contributive system with high levels of contribution (Cuesta and Olivera 2010) . Others, such as Pagés and Madrigal (2008) , Perry et al. (2007) , Camacho et al. (2009) , Maloney (2004 Maloney ( , 1999 , Maloney and Bosch (2006) , Maloney, Goni and Bosch (2007) , Kugler and Kugler (2009) , Mondragón et al. (2010) , have shown that provisions of social protection, notably non-wage costs, incentivize informality.
In Colombia, serious design defects are partly to blame for these uneven results in social insurance coverage and high informality. Administrative considerations hinder a smooth transition from contributive to subsidized health care programs, which disincentives the transition from informal to formal jobs and, ultimately, prevents increases in pension coverage (Bernal et al. 2009 ). Nuñez (2008) suggests that the practice of benefits-packaging does not necessarily coincide with the worker's needs: for example, the requirement to contribute for 1,300 weeks or 26 years in order to enjoy the right to a pension against a backdrop of high labor migration between the formal and the informal sectors. 4 Despite this evidence, only a few authors, such as Kugler and Kugler (2009) , Mondragón-Velez, Peña and Wills (2010) and Camacho, Conover and Hoyos (2009) , conduct econometric analysis of the occupational choice in Colombia, typically as an aggregated indicator in the economy or as a rational decision within firms and across sectors. To the best of our knowledge, no study analyses these effects either as an individual worker decision or within the context of transition/mobility trends.
The objective of this paper is, first, to shed more light into the factors associated with labor transitions, specifically in countries with large informal sectors. Secondly, the analysis sheds more light into the role that healthcare and pension benefits play in the decisions to migrate among jobs, that is, how attractive they are to motivate workers to move (vis-à-vis other drivers). Understanding the key factors behind labor transitions should prevent policymakers from under-or overestimating the impacts that social security reforms may have on workers' (or more generally, on working age individuals) labor decisions. In order to do so, this paper analyzes the magnitude, direction and composition of labor transitions in Colombia between 2008 and 2009, using recently available data from the latest two rounds of Fedesarrollo's Social Longitudinal Survey, FSLS (Fedesarrollo 2008 (Fedesarrollo , 2009 ), a household survey panel data representative of the 13 main metropolitan areas of the country. The paper also provides evidence on the personal and professional characteristics of those who transition across occupations and jobs, including their personal circumstances, motivations, preferences and exposure to and strategies against risks. Finally, the paper explores econometrically how these factors contribute to observed labor transitions. Even though the analysis does not establish causal links between the crisis and labor transitions, results confirm that between 2008 and 2009 there were large and asymmetric transitions among occupations in Colombia. Asymmetric transitions mask different mobility patterns across occupations: formal salaried workers may first try to move to the informal sector rather than transitioning into unemployment or out of the labor force, while an informal self-employed worker may more likely move into unemployment and out of the labor force. This result may be picking up not only period-specific labor dynamics but also a more structural phenomenon whereby workers voluntarily opt into salaried or self-employed occupations. Colombian workers appear relatively insensitive to a set of risks-even economic risksduring the recent period of crisis. Interestingly, econometric analyses show that social security coverage is associated with reductions in the probability of occupational transitions, but pension and health insurance programs each have a different effect on the direction of the transition. These results on the volume of and motivations behind occupational transitions question the fiscal sustainability, economic efficiency and social protection capacity of the public strategy of generously increasing both social security and social assistance benefits (Appendix 1 succinctly describes the Colombian social protection system). These conclusions, however, need to be contrasted for periods of analysis longer than two years and in contexts other than economic crises.
ESTIMATING LABOR TRANSITIONS
Transition matrices are simple conceptual tools that capture movements of a given worker or group of workers from state "i" to state "j". The term "state" may refer to sectors, occupations, activities and other feature of the labor market (well-paid jobs, decent jobs). As matrices become more disaggregated, groups may range from, for example, formal, informal or out of employment, and may also simultaneously include other features such as age, marital status or education (see . In its simplest form (see Cunningham, 2009) , each KxK transition matrix cell provides information on the probability of individuals in a given group "i" moving to state "j" (i,j=1…K) out of the total number of individuals in that group potentially moving to state "j":
The simplicity of matrix (1) makes it a preferable tool compared to aggregated parametric estimates of mobility between two periods, as in Geweke et als (1986) , or estimates through multiple periods, which typically revolve around a welfare indicator such as labor income (see Fields and Ok, 1999 , Fields et al. 2007 and Cuesta, Ñopo and Pizzolito, 2011 . When the analysis describes movements from one state to the other, the transition matrix described above is sufficient. warn, however, that those statistics-which they call "intensities"-should not be confused with "propensities". Intensities refer to the probability of ending in each sector when all workers of a given sector were to leave it, that is, conditional on separation (see also Pages and Stampini, 2009) . But this tells little about the underlying causes behind the moves, such as differentiated opportunities in the end sectors (in terms of absolute numbers or relative rate of openings) due to credit constraints, gender or cultural discrimination or changing business cycle demands. Nor does it cast light on supply issues embedded in the comparative advantages of certain workers (given their endowments and preferences) to work in specific sectors. The ability of the analysis to discern among such factors is very relevant to make inferences on how labor markets will react to shocks and policy reforms, or for testing hypotheses such as the voluntary nature of informality. show for Argentina, Brazil and Mexico that when accounting for personal characteristics (worker's age, education and gender) and expanding or declining business cycle demand, the traditional empirical finding of large asymmetries between formal and informal flows is reversed into much more symmetrical flows.
Unfortunately, at least two serious practical caveats are associated with transitional propensities. First, the continuous-time homogenous Markov process (with discrete-time panel observations, as in Bosch and Maloney 2007) assumes that the probability of an outcome is independent of the previous history of the process. In practice, that would indicate that the probability of two youths ending up in a formal job is independent of whether they worked previously or they were out of the labor market. Corrections to this caveat-as in mover-stayer models (Fougere and Kamioka 2003)-assume, instead, that there are individuals who never move away from their stationary state, while individuals in other groups are able to transition. While the concept is appealing-in the same way that the notion of chronic poverty vis-à-vis transitory poverty is-it may be hard to determine a priori which individuals pertain to which group. As well, these models do not capture mobility between formal and informal sectors if employment is a single category vis-à-vis unemployment. See Fougere and Kamionka (2005) for a more detailed discussion regarding this point.
As a result, the key question this paper addresses is not how best infer the occupational structure in some future steady state or whether is reasonable to assume time-invariant Markov processes in contexts of crisis. Rather, the paper explores the size and magnitude of recent occupational transitions in Colombia and assesses the extent to which previous shocks, perceptions of future risk perceptions, and social security coverage affect such transitions in stress situations.
DATA
In 2004, the Colombian think-tank Fedesarrollo, with the support of the Bogotá, Cali, and Bucaramanga chambers of commerce, converted a household survey in these three cities collected since 1999 into a rotating panel, fully renewed every four years. The 2008 phase saw a substantial increase in the sample size with the introduction of 10 additional cities (Medellín, Barranquilla, Manizales, Pasto, Pereira, Cúcuta, Ibagué, Montería, Cartagena, and Villavicencio) that form part of the "national urban total" defined by DANE for the calculation of unemployment figures. Hence, the sample is representative of all the urban population of the country or 76% of the total population. The first three cities represent 73 percent of the sample, while the other 10 represent the remaining 27 percent. The survey, carried out door-to-door to all household members present, is structured in several modules capturing individual labor market and social security records; access to social protection programs; risks, shocks and coping strategies; and housing, demographic and personal information. 6 Importantly, the 2009 round incorporates additional detailed questions on labor transactions (from the last to the present job) and workers' affiliation to social security in healthcare and pensions (from the last change in status to the current one). That round also includes a detailed module on shocks during the last 12 months and responses adopted by individuals and/or households. Shocks include economic downturns (such as unemployment or the unexpected loss of assets), health problems (such as illness or grave injury) or other types (for example, catastrophes or personal calamities such as marital separation or abandonment by an important household member). There is also a module on the perception of risks for the coming 12 months and the strategies-planned or executed-considered to confront these risks.
Unfortunately, a number of limitations in the design of the survey prevent a complete reconstruction of the labor history of working-aged individuals in the 12 months between the collections of the two stages. Each individual in each stage, 2008 and 2009, is asked whether he or she changed jobs during the last 12 months, but individuals are only asked to report the job previous to the current one. So, if one individual changed jobs twice between his or her interviews in 2008 and 2009, only the latest change is registered. Thus, multiple episodes of mobility cannot be captured, but only the last move to the current job within the last 12 months. In addition, the set of additional questions regarding past labor status in the 2009 questionnaire is only available for individuals who were not interviewed in the last year -for those interviewed in 2008, it is assumed that their answers with respect to the period prior to 2008 would or should not change--and for salaried workers who were interviewed in 2008 but had been working for less than 12 months on their present job at the moment of the interview.
These workers are believed to be more likely -or more vulnerable-to abandon that recently started job (for example, by not completing satisfactorily their probation period or being the first ones to be fired in case of crisis), so they are followed with special attention. For those salaried workers with tenure longer than 12 months, labor history can be re-constructed using recall data from the 2008 database, but for the rest (that is, self-employed, unemployed and out 7 Appendix 2 presents the basic summary statistics of the survey. Tables 1 and 2 report stylized facts of the Colombian labor market. Unemployment rates estimated from the FSLS rounds reach 10.9 and 11.7 percent in 2008 and 2009 respectively, very similar to the official unemployment rates for the comparable 13 main metropolitan areas: 10.9 and 12.3 percent respectively (DANE 2010, p. 9) . In 2008, labor market participation reached 54.4 percent, 66.3 percent among males and 44.5 percent among females in the working age (12 and older). By occupation, 60.3 percent (60.7 percent) of males (females) were salaried, 38.8 percent (37.1 percent) self-employed and 0.9 percent (2.2 percent) unpaid workers. By economic sector, some 51.8 percent of workers were occupied in services, followed by 40 percent in retail, manufactures and other sectors combined. About 27 percent of workers pertained to SISBEN 1 and 2.
THE COLOMBIAN LABOR MARKET: STYLIZED FACTS
8 Only 38.8 percent of occupied workers were in the formal sector (defined in this paper as workers with pension and health insurance coverage).
The composition of the labor market does not change much in 2009 except for a marked decrease in the participation rate down to 51.1 percent, clearly associated with the crisis, as (along with increasing unemployment) the number of individuals giving up on their search of a job increases. Those most affected are males, although these changes do not substantially alter the existing gender gap in Colombia. Self-employment increases for both males and females, while construction and services drop their share in total occupation. In 2009, more workers pertain to SISBEN 1 and 2 categories than the previous year. Most interestingly, a significant proportion of Colombian workers report voluntarily choosing their employment category: 44 percent and 49 percent of the salaried and self-employed workers, respectively. This evidence is in line with findings reported in Perry et al. (2007) , who argue that informality in Latin America is not a dominant exclusion phenomenon but, rather, one in which exclusion factors and voluntary selection of self-employment compete. This is also the case in Colombia, although Perry et al. (2007, p. 7) note that a larger-than-average proportion of selfemployed workers in Colombia (this paper estimates 51 percent; Rentería 2007 estimates 60 percent) would prefer formal occupations vis-à-vis the Latin American region as a whole (about a third).
Economic shocks increase for all categories, especially among formal workers, for whom their incidence during 2009 doubles with respect to the year 2008 (Table 3) . Other categories also see increases in the vicinity of 50 percent with respect to levels in 2008. Interestingly, there is little variation on the incidence of health shocks between both years across all categories (only the household heads' deaths decrease from 2008 to 2009 is statistically significant). These findings point to distinctive dynamics of shocks by their nature. Also, despite the increase in the incidence of shocks expected from the crisis, perceptions about the risks of losing employment or incomes and risk of death have not changed from 2008 to 2009. This is especially true across formal workers. This may indicate that either their perceptions are not consistent with at least short-term evidence, or that the intensity of previous shocks is not sufficient to modify their risk perceptions. This is consistent among labor groups. This is confirmed by the fact that between 42% to 58% of individuals interviewed report to have never thought or have thought only little about serious shocks and, unsurprisingly, between 45% and 70% of COP 269,362 and COP 281,384 per person in 2008 , respectively, according to MESEP (2010 . Source: Authors' estimates from Fedesarrollo (2008 Fedesarrollo ( , 2009 ) FSLS.
individuals (depending on the nature of the risk) report to have done nothing in response to a shock. The FSLS questions individuals about their valuation, knowledge and beneficiary of public social programs, including social security schemes. Valuation is high on average-close to four out of five possible points-a finding common across all social programs, with little difference across occupational status (Table 4) . Nor are large differences found between social security (health care and pension, whether contributive, non-contributive or private) and other programs of social protection and assistance. These results are consistent across individuals reporting to know either a lot or little about the programs that they are asked to value and whether or not they are beneficiaries of such programs (results not shown).
TRANSITION MATRICES
This section looks in detail at transition flows, their taxonomy and their determinants. Initial estimates show that important occupational mobility asymmetries exist. One-third of "current" self-employed workers were salaried workers in their previous job vis-à-vis only 5 percent of "current" salaried workers moving from previous self-employment (see Table 5 , Row 1). Gaviria (2004) By looking at the sum of off-diagonal shares, Table 5 shows that some 81 percent of formal self-employed; 65 percent of informal salaried; 45 percent of informal self-employed and 35 percent of formal salaried in 2008 ended up in other labor categories in 2009. 9 For the most stable group, the unoccupied, some 85 percent of unoccupied workers in 2008 remained so in 2009. This higher immobility among the unoccupied is consistent with traditionally high unemployment rates in Colombia. Thus, although the economic crisis makes non-participation in the labor market more costly, the decline in labor demand associated with the crisis also makes participation more difficult.
Occupational transitions are asymmetric in nature. The proportion of salaried workers who transitioned between 2008 and 2009 from formality to informality was 10 percent, compared to 17 percent from informality to formality. Among the self-employed, some 45 percent transitioned from formality to informality, compared with 1.7 percent from informality to formality. Among transitioning workers who maintained their formality status but changed their occupation (that is, moved from formal salaried to formal self-employed, for example), numbers ranged from 0.8 percent to 17.4 percent. What these figures conceal, however, is that transitions among initially formal workers (that is, formal in 2008) took place within formal occupations and less so between occupation categories. Instead, those who in 2008 started as informal workers transitioned between occupational categories more so than within informal occupations. This evidence qualifies the original aggregated finding for an asymmetric mobility within the Colombian labor market: although it is typically less costly to move from formal to informal categories than vice versa,
10 it also appears that formal workers may tend to move first across occupations within the formal sector rather than directly moving into informality. This may be because workers understand that it is more difficult to get back to formality once they enter the ranks of informality. Results show that salaried workers are more likely to become unemployed than move into an informal salaried category by a factor of almost two to one. Previously undocumented in the literature, we find that insurance transitions are also large and asymmetrical. Only one-third of workers who change jobs between 2008 and 2009 (nearly 54 percent of those employed in 2009) maintained full social security coverage in both periods, 27 percent maintained incomplete or no coverage, 13 percent gained insurance and the remaining 27 percent saw their situation worsen. Source: Authors' estimates from Fedesarrollo (2008 Fedesarrollo ( , 2009 
ELS
An additional question is how socioeconomic status affects the magnitude and direction of occupational transitions and transitional asymmetries. Several dimensions can capture socioeconomic status, and this study uses a simple characterization based on whether the household per capita income of a given individual is below or above the sample median of household per capita incomes. Using this simple measure is advisable for a number of reasons. First, other obvious alternatives are troublesome. For example, the means-tested targeting mechanism, SISBEN, categorizes households by socioeconomic condition based on a set of personal and household features and assets, but it is not regularly updated-certainly not between 2008 and 2009. A second alternative, the official poverty line, may not inspire sufficient confidence as there were structural changes in its calculation in 2006 when a new household survey, Gran Encuesta Integrada de Hogares, replaced the Encuesta Permanente de Hogares without grandfathering.
11 Third, any socioeconomic classification based on a distribution of labor earnings may be endogenous to the very transition that it is intended to capture, which can be reasonably assumed to be strongly (even if not exclusively) motivated by wanting to improve individual or household earnings. So can other categorizations based on consumer goods and assets that are collected in the Colombian survey and whose acquisition may also depend on increased disposable incomes after transitions take place. Of course, a relative poverty measure will not eliminate endogenous concerns, but to the extent that it limits the number of categories to analyze (only two categories, below or above the median, instead of five or ten income quintiles and deciles), biases should be less critical.
Results disaggregating transitions by category and poverty status confirm that poor and non-poor workers transition in different fashions (Table 6 ). For each category of informality and occupation, only the informal salaried, the informal self-employed and individuals out of the labor force have comparable diagonal results. In contrast, there are substantive differences in the relative proportions of those who did not transition among formal salaried, formal self-employed and unemployed. Among the former two, the nonpoor in 2008 seem to have transitioned more than the poor, while the unemployed poor transitioned more than the non-poor. Results confirm a high volume of transitions when considering socioeconomic status. The magnitude of these transitions is not negligible and, again, transitions are asymmetric: a transitioning worker is more likely to remain within the same socioeconomic category in which the individual started in 2008 than to change socioeconomic status. A quarter of the sample of individuals moved into poverty (below the median per capita income) and about a third out of poverty (above the median). Between a quarter and half of all transitions take place within the same occupation category.
12
We further investigate how personal characteristics and circumstances affect labor transitions. Some 40 percent of labor transitions between 2008 and 2009 took place among individuals age 35 and 64, and two-thirds between 19 and 64 (Table 7) . Females were more likely to transition than men (including transitions into unemployment and out of the labor force), and three-quarters of those transitioning had up to secondary education. Interestingly, one-third of individuals transitioning were household heads, while another third were their offspring. Marital status did not seem to strongly affect the likelihood of transitions: married and cohabitating individuals reported a similar proportion than single, divorced, separated or widowed. Transitioning individuals earn COP 612,000 on average, or 1.2 minimum wages, which is lower than individuals who did not transition, who earned an average of COP 795,000. That represented almost 30 percent higher earnings for the non-transitioning group, a statistically significant difference. But there was no difference in the total household per capita income of transitioning and non-transitioning individuals. Although it is hard to definitively conclude from this evidence-as other household members may or may not transition as well-it would appear consistent with labor decisions being taken at a household and not individual level in order to maximize their level of welfare (see Ashenfelter and Heckman 1974 for an early seminal argument). In any case, In addition to the personal transition profiles, the section also reports a simple causality analysis exploring which factors are more strongly associated with individual transitions. Column 1 in Table 8 presents the results of a logit function that predicts the probability of observing a labor transition. This model assesses a number of determinants or drivers of transitions (typically observable factors), regardless of the origin and destination status. Hence, it shows which conditions and characteristics made more likely a working age individual to engage in labor transitions. Columns 2 to 4 show the results of a multinomial logit that predicts specific transitions into the categories of out of the labor force, unemployment, informality and formality. Estimates from each column in this model should be interpreted as the effects of each determinant in predicting a transition into a specific labor condition. Thus, the estimated effect of the household head dummy in the transition into informality (column 4 in Table 8 ) indicates the effect of being a household head (vis-à-vis the rest of household positions) in the likelihood of becoming an informal worker for all other status (out, unemployed or formal). It is worth noting that this is the most parsimonious model in terms of assumptions on labor decision-making and labor market structure. An alternative model would have implied that individuals first decide whether or not to transition and, conditional on transitioning, whether moving into informal or formal jobs. Other alternative model might have assumed that there is some ranking associated with labor categories: from out of the labor force to unemployment, from unemployment to informality and from informality to formality. However, evidence reported in section 4 above suggests that a significant proportion of individuals opt for self-employment and salaried categories rather than being forced into such jobs by some notion of occupational hierarchy. As a result, a parsimonious specification that requires the least number of assumptions is preferred over alternative assumptions. Equation (2) presents the reduced form specification for the individual i's probability of transitioning, the well known logistic function (see Kmenta 1986):
(1) Poor formal salaried; (2) Non-poor salaried; (3)Poor informal salaried; (4)Non-poor informal salaried; (5) Poor formal self-employed; (6) Non-poor formal self-employed; (7) Poor informal self-employed; (8)Non-poor informal self-employed; (9)Poor unemployed; (9) Non-poor unemployed; (10)Poor out-of-labor force; (12) Non-poor out-oflabor force
where P(Ti=1) is the individual probability of transitioning-regardless of origin and host occupation categories-and Xj is the set of socioeconomic and demographic conditions of each individual and his or her household (traditionally shown to affect labor supply decisions as shown long ago in Killingsworth and Heckman 1986, Pencavel 1986) , as well as the initial labor and social security status, the two key variables of interest in this analysis.
Equation (3), in turn, presents the reduced form specification for individual transitioning that specifically defines the host occupation of after transitioning. That is, P(Ti=k) accounts for the probability of transitioning into the k-th occupation category, i.e., transitioning into inactivity, unemployment, informality or formality, respectively:
Results confirm several findings from transition matrices (Table 8 , Column 1). Age increases the probability of transitioning but at a decreasing pace, the turning point being 42 years of age. Education also has an inverted U pattern but it is not statistically significant. Household heads are less likely to transition than others household members. The occupational category in 2008 also plays a role into determining the 2009 labor status, consistent with the transition matrices results in this section. Informal workers are more likely to transition than formal workers, but the formal self-employed are the most likely to transition and, as seen below, more so into inactivity rather than informal jobs. Being covered already by health insurance reduces the probability of transitioning, but pension coverage does not have an impact on that decision. Our constructed indicator for preference biases-capturing the degree of unbalance between a high valuation of a given program and a low level of knowledge about it-is not found to be statistically significant. In other words, even when preferences may play a role in labor decisions, personal and labor circumstances remain dominating factors. When looking at occupation-specific transitions (that is, moving into inactive, unemployed, informal and formal categories), as expected age describes an inverted U pattern among occupied workers and the opposite among the unoccupied (Table 8 , Columns 2 to 4). The younger the individual, the more likely to be unemployed and/or out of the labor force; as he or she gets older the more likely he or she will find an occupation, but at a declining rate with age. Education reduces the chances of being out of the labor force, unoccupied or informal, but this effect is not statistically significant. Education increases the chances of transitioning into formality, and the effect is statistically significant. Men are more likely to be occupied (both informal and formally) and less likely to be out of the labor force (all statistically significant effects), but gender does statistically affect the probability of transitioning into unemployment.
Being occupied in 2008 increases the probability of transitioning out of the labor force, which is consistent with the high stability of out-of-labor-force categories reported by the transition matrices. The self-employed are more likely to move out of the labor force; however, salaried formal workers are more likely to move into unemployment. Being a formal worker reduces the chances of moving into informal categories, while being informal reduces the probability of moving into formal jobs. Health coverage reduces the probability of a transition into informality, an effect that is statistically significant, but it does not increase the probability of becoming formal, unemployed or out of the labor force. Having pension coverage also reduces the probability of transitioning into informality and increases the probability of moving into formality (although the effect is ten times smaller than that for transitions into informality). Pension coverage does not significantly affect moving into unemployment or out of the labor force. Personal biases are not statistically significant.
It is worth noting that the model provides a good fit predicting the observed transitions. It predicts 88 percent of truly observed transitions. It predicts a transition incidence of 26 percent of working age individuals in the sample, while the truly observed incidence is 29 percent. Finally, the transition models were re-estimated for male-only, female-only and poor and noon-poor separated samples. Results (available upon request) are reassuringly robust and confirm the main results reported in Table 8 . Interestingly, however, sub-sample estimates show that for females (poor and non-poor), being a household head, does not increase or decrease their probability of transitioning. This result points to the trade-off between economic need and family care responsibilities might be even stronger among females heading a household than among male household heads, thus canceling out each other.
CONCLUSIONS
This paper quantifies labor transitions in Colombia between 2008 and 2009, taking advantage of panel data collected throughout the crisis. Results -admittedly covering a short span and a specific context of economic crisis-confirm that in the context of the financial crisis, labor transitions remain large in Colombia and asymmetric in nature: a worker is more likely to move from formality to informality than vice versa, while an inactive individual is more likely to remain so than change his or her condition. This is consistent with previous evidence in Colombia, as reported in the introduction. What the current analysis adds is that this asymmetry may mask different patterns across occupations. Salaried formal workers may first try to become salaried informal workers, rather than moving into unemployment or out of the labor force, while a self-employed informal worker may directly move into unemployment and out of the labor force. Workers from low socioeconomic status transition more than workers with higher education level but lower incomes, which may indicate that a larger need to transition to earn more incomes dominates better chances for a successful transition (of those with more education and incomes). The evidence also confirms that transitions may respond not only to an individual motivation to improve his or her condition, but may be part of a household strategy to maximize its welfare conditions. When looking at the profiles of those who transition and those who do not, the substantive differences in individual earnings between transitioning and non-transitioning workers vanish when comparing their total household per capita incomes. Coupling this evidence of large, asymmetric, and socioeconomically distinctive transitions with coverage of social protection mechanisms provides a mixed picture. Results show that health coverage is associated with a lower probability of transitioning, especially into informal jobs, but pension coverage is not. Also, evidence shows that social protection coverage is not much related to expectations of protection against future risks: larger exposure to shocks does not affect the perception of future risks, regardless of being protected or not and regardless of having suffered past shocks, including economic and labor shocks in the context of the crisis. From a policy point of view, these findings are important for policy makers. Either over-or underestimating the role and magnitude that some factors play in individuals' labor decisions may well contribute to turn reforms aimed to reduce informality ineffective. In this line, findings confirm previous results pointing to a similar valuation of social protection mechanisms among Colombians, as explained by Cuesta and Oliveira (2010) , with a generalized perception that non-contributive schemes have a similar quality to contributive schemes, but are free for poor informal workers. In light of (i) similar valuations of formal and informal protection mechanisms, (ii) lack of awareness of the risk-protection roles of social security, (iii) strong preferences of workers for a certain occupation, and (iv) high-volume transitions, the public strategy of generous social benefits for both formal and informal workers is expected to deincentivize formality while increasing the strain on the fiscal sustainability of social protection. The much-debated need for reforms of the labor and social protection system in Colombia must take into consideration the high volume of labor transitions, their nature and their motivations. Nonetheless, these conclusions for Colombia need to be confirmed in periods other than a severe crisis and in contexts with labor market structures different to those in Colombia (that is, lower levels of informality). Furthermore, future information on labor transitions should ideally register all moves within and across occupational sectors among individuals in their working age and not just the last transition within the last year, as it is the case with the Colombian panel data. Coinciding with the increase in social assistance spending, a new approach of social promotion is conceived, seeking, ambitiously, to simultaneously tackle prevention and mitigation strategies, on the one hand, whilst attacking poverty, on the other. See Table A1 .1 for the complete structure of the social protection system, its qualifying conditions and the distinctive treatment by type of worker. The resulting Social Protection System has five main pillars: the Integral Social Security System, which is universal, promotes people's insurance against various risks in healthcare and pensions; the Sistema Social de Riesgos (Social Risk System) seeks to look after people in the event of an accident that affects their living conditions; the Sistema de Formación de Capital Humano (Human Capital Formation System) is aimed at preparing the population for incorporation into the job market through continuous training throughout the working lifetime; the access to assets pillar, whereby families are supported so that they can generate income and acquire assets; and the Sistema de Promoción Social (Social Promotion System) aimed at overcoming structural poverty, which goes beyond the assistance based approach Source: Authors' estimates from Fedesarrollo (2008 Fedesarrollo ( , 2009 
ENDNOTES
1 Khanna, Newhouse and Pacci (2010) show that for a sample of middle income countries, declines in employment rates between 2008 and 2009 were larger than declines in GDP growth rates. These adjustments add to a grim picture of persistently high informality levels and structurally low labor earnings mobility in the Latin American region (Cuesta, Ñopo and Pizzolitto 2011) . ILO (2009) reports large return inflows back into traditionally labor-sending countries such as India, Pakistan, Ecuador, El Salvador and East European countries. In China, that report finds substantive internal migration from urban to rural areas of about 20 million people in 2009 alone. 2 Colombia has reduced significantly its historical gap with the region in terms of social spending, mainly due to sizeable increases in social security, which increased from 3 percent to 7 percent of GDP between the early 1990s and mid-2000s (CEPAL 2011).
3 For example, Levy (2008) argues that differences in the nature of the benefits and the financing between social security and social assistance programs result in a tax on salaried labor and a subsidy to nonsalaried labor. This results in larger than optimal informal employment, which lowers aggregate labor productivity, and distortions in the allocation of public resources on investment, which reduces the productivity of capital. Reductions in labor and capital productivities both result in a lower rate of growth of GDP. 4 Another shortcoming relates to the fact that some benefits require additional prerequisites that cannot be fulfilled by workers earning only the minimum wage: for example, certain housing subsidies require a salary of two or three times the minimum salary, and those subsidies directed at minimum salary earners themselves also require savings of at least 10 percent of the value of the home (around US$1,000). 5 The 2008 and 2009 survey rounds are divided into eight thematic modules: (i) housing and services, (ii) demography; (iii) education; (iv) health care; (v) labor market and social security; (vi) welfare conditions; (vii) knowledge, coverage, and valuation of social programs; and (viii) vulnerability. The survey was carried out door-to-door, with all household members present. If certain household members could not be present at the time of the survey, other responsible adult members of the household were asked to answer their survey questions. The questions concerning the household as a whole were answered by the head of the household or his or her spouse or, in the case of their absence, by another responsible adult household member. Questions mixed multiple choice (read or unread) and open ended, depending on the nature of the question. 6 Rotating panels allow for short-term analysis of individual or household change and long-term analysis of population and subgroup change, at a lower cost than a full panel and at a lower burden of respondents (Park, YS; Kim, KW; Choi, J W 2001) . As it is well known, panel data allow the observation of behavior of the same individual over time and across circumstances and shocks that can be traced. This is possible because the new and substituted subsamples rotated are comparable in terms of their key basic characteristics. This is also the case of the Fedesarrollo panel used in this analysis, which replaces households that refused to participate and others randomly selected for rotation based on the first and secondary sampling units (unitary sampling Census units and blocs) to ensure representativeness of the new subsample introduced (Sabogal 2010). 7 It is not possible to assess the magnitude of this bias as we do not have additional information on the average number of transitions in the 2008 round, which would have been suggestive of the average size of past transitions in a year. 8 SISBEN is a means-tested targeting mechanism, categorizing households by socioeconomic condition based on a set of personal and household features and assets. The index goes from 1 to 6, where 1 is the poorest and 6 the richest. Social programs in Colombia typically consider eligible beneficiaries to individuals and/or households pertaining to SISBEN 1 and/or 2. 9 This is the preferred presentation to report transitions for two reasons. First, percent changes across occupational categories within each occupation is the traditional way which other analyses have reported transitions, and so, allow to compare the current results with previous analyses. Second, by comparing changes in relative terms, the magnitude of transitions from densely occupied categories to scarcely populated categories (and vice versa) is not predetermined as it would be the case in reports of absolute changes. 10 For example, an informal worker that becomes formal will lose its registration to the subsided health care program. Regaining registration if he or she becomes informal again implies a waiting list of months, which creates a cost or disincentive to move into formality. Such costs do not exist from moving into informality. 11 As seen above (Table 1) , classifications of workers based on SISBEN and poverty lines differ substantially (even though trends move in similar directions) given that the official poverty lines are well below the median of per capita household incomes in the sample: COP 281,384 and COP 850,999 respectively for 2009. Also, the estimated poverty incidence from the FSLS sample, at 70.5 percent, doubles the official poverty incidence for the 13 metropolitan areas, estimated by MESEP (2010) as 30.6 percent. 12 Appendix 3 reports the results of an alternative socioeconomic disaggregated transition analysis using the official poverty line estimated by MESEP (2010). The key results on volume and asymmetry of transitions do not change with the official definition of poverty, although there is an increase in relative terms of transitions into poor informal self-employed, poor informal salaried and poor formal salaried, and a decrease in transitions into non-poor informal self-employed, nonpoor informal salaried and non-poor formal salaried. 13 The profile of transitioning and non transitioning individuals were also estimated for males and females separately, with differences observed in terms of household headship, coverage of pension insurance and marital status. Differences in terms of incomes are also observed by gender but patterns remain unaltered: transitioning individuals in each gender, on average, earn less than non transitioning individuals; something that is not observed when comparing household incomes.
Results available upon request to the authors. 14 This section is based on Cuesta and Oliveira (2011) .
